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HOFSTRA IAW RUVIEW
Volume 13, No. 3

Spring 1985

STATE COMMISSION TREATMENT OF
NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATION COSTS
Paul Rodgers and Charles D. Gray*
INTRODUCTION

In its February 11, 1985 cover story, Forbes magazine sounded
its death-knell for the nuclear power industry in the United States.
The author noted that the nation's electric utilities had cancelled
seventy-five nuclear power plants since 1978, including twenty-eight

plants in various stages of construction, and concluded that "[tihe
failure of the U.S. nuclear power program ranks as the largest managerial disaster in business history, a disaster on a monumental
scale."' While opinions differ regarding the magnitude of this "disaster" and where to place the blame, 2 there is no doubt that the nation's ambitious nuclear generating program accumulated huge debts
that the United States will be paying for decades.3 The costs of nu* Mr. Rodgers and Mr. Gray are, respectively, General Counsel and Assistant General
Counsel of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners. Any views and
opinions expressed in this Article are solely those of the authors, and should not be attributed
to the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners or its members.
1. Cook, Nuclear Follies, FORBEs, Feb. 11, 1985, at cover, 82.
2. Commentators cite various factors leading to substantial cost overruns on nuclear
power projects, including inflation, two Arab oil embargoes and the resulting slowdown in
industrial growth, irresponsibility on the part of regulators, incompetence of utility management and nuclear contractors, and the anti-nuclear activities of protest groups, environmentalists, and consumer advocates. See id. at 83-84; Wechsler, Nuclear Power: Who Fools the
Bill?, DuN's Bus. MONTH, June 1984, at 70-71.
3. See Cook, supra note I, at 84. It is estimated that the electric utility industry has
already invested $125 billion in nuclear power, and that another $140 billion will be invested
before 1990. Id. at cover. Cost overruns add an estimated $100 billion in interest and other
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clear plants that utilities were able to complete, often at great ex-

pense,
of the
utility
plants

are straining the finances of utilities in virtually every region
country.4 The cost impact of these completed plants is felt by
ratepayers, investors, and taxpayers. As additional high-cost
are completed, controversy over the allocation of their costs

will likely escalate. 5 Another group of costs, however, is even more

controversial: costs incurred by utilities in constructing plants that
will never generate one kilowatt hour of electricity because the
plants have been abandoned.
In the early to mid-1970's, many electric utilities decided that
new power plants were needed in order to provide sufficient generating capacity to meet future demand for power from consumers.6
Based upon demand forecasts and the expected costs of different
types of construction, these utilities chose to build and operate one
or more nuclear generating stations that were expected to be in service in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Certain intervening events,
including the two Arab oil embargoes, endemic inflationary forces in
the economy, and the "event" at Three Mile Island in March, 1979,8
expenses to the nation's electric bill. Wechsler, supra note 2, at 70.
4. For example, six major utilities, including the Long Island Lighting Co., Public Service of New Hampshire, Consumers Power in Michigan, and Public Service of Indiana, are
under such extreme financial prssure as a result of cost overruns and abandonments of nuclear projects that they "are in serious danger of going into bankruptcy." Cook, supra note 1,
at 83. See Wechsler, supra note 2, at 71-73.
5. Utility shareholders and bondholders have already begun to pay for the substantial
cost overruns and cancellations of nuclear power plants. Dividends have been cut or suspended
by a number of utilities, while the market value of utility stocks has fallen, in some cases
dramatically. Wechsler, supra note 2, at 72. In July, 1983, Washington Public Power Supply
System defaulted on $2.2 billion in bonds. Cook, supra note 1, at 96. It is estimated that
taxpayers will ultimately foot the bill for up to 42% of these costs over the next ten years, as a
result of write-offs by utilities and their shareholders and deferred taxes and depreciation on
plants. Wechsler, supra note 2, at 73. Likewise, ratepayers are paying these costs in the form
of higher rates. Cook, supra note 1, at 83. In addition, some utilities and regulatory commisSions are faced with the prospect of "rate shock" as a result of the addition of these costly
plants to rate base. Id. at 94.
6. In the late 1960's, utilities were faced with annual industrial growth of seven to eight
percent - a rate that would require "the doubling of electric generating capacity every ten
years." Wechsler, supra note 2, at 70. See Cook, supra note 1, at 88.
7. Studies completed during the years from 1967 to 1977 concluded that nuclear power
plants would provide electricity at substantially cheaper rates than coal-fired plants. ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMIN., US. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS:

CAUSES,

COSTS, AND CONSEQUENCES 28 (Apr. 1983) [hereinafter cited as EIA REPORT].

8. See Cook, supra note 1, at 88-89; Wechsler, supra note 2, at 70-71. Of all the
problems facing the nuclear power industry in the 1970's, perhaps none was more damaging
than the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI), on March 28, 1979. At TMI, a stuck valve and
mistakes by operating personnel caused the nuclear reactor to overheat dangerously. Cook,
supra note 1, at 88. As a result, the reactor core was damaged and radioactive gases were
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led utility management to reassess construction plans and, as a result, to cancel planned nuclear plants. 9 At first, the utilities cancelled
so-called "paper plants" - plants for which actual construction had
not commenced. 10 Beginning in 1980, however, utilities began to
cancel nuclear plants already under construction."'
State and federal regulatory commissions are confronted with
the question of how to allocate the costs associated with cancelled
nuclear power plants. Publicly-owned utilities present different allocation options than utilities that are privately-owned. Publicly-owned
utilities raise capital for new plant construction by issuing bonds.
The abandonment costs of their cancelled nuclear plants must be recovered from ratepayers, unless these utilities default on their bonds.
Since a default would have a prohibitive effect on the ability of these
utilities to raise capital in the future, ratepayers are seen as the only
available group to bear these costs. 1 2 In the case of privately-owned
utilities, however, costs can be allocated
among three groups: rate3
payers, investors, and taxpayers.1

This Article will provide an overview of state regulatory comreleased. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., US. DEP'T OF ENERGY, US. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR
POWER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, CURRENT STATUS, AND OUTLOOK 15 (Mar. 1982). After

TMI, hundreds of safety regulations were promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the federal agency charged with licensing and regulating nuclear power plants. Cook,
supra note I, at 89. In many instances, these new safety regulations forced utility management
to make substantial modifications in already completed construction. It is estimated that these
modifications resulted in 20% to 30% of the fivefold increase in the cost of a typical nuclear
power project. Wechsler, supra note 2, at 70-71.
9. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports that, of the 120 nuclear units
ordered in the ten-year period between 1972 and 1982, 100 have been cancelled. The EIA
study defines a nuclear plant cancellation as having occurred when a utility orders a nuclear
steam supply system for a plant from a vendor and later cancels it. EIA REPORT, supra note 7,
at 4-5.
There are many reasons why utilities decide to cancel planned nuclear generating plants.
The EIA has outlined five basic factors that lead to plant cancellations: (1) lower forecasted
load growth as a result of higher rates, consumer conservation, and slower industrial growth;
(2) constraints on the utility's ability to raise construction capital at affordable rates; (3)
safety-related changes in regulatory requirements for plant construction that increase costs;
(4) changes in plant economics that cause utilities to substitute other forms of generation for
nuclear; and (5) decisions in some states to deny certificates to plants still in the planning
stages. Id. at 4-32.
10. Id. at 4.
11. Id. at 4, 6.
12. Id. at 38; see id. at 19. But see supra note 5 (Washington Public Power Supply
System default).
13. Id. at 38. See infra notes 55-72 and accompanying text. Of the 100 nuclear reactors
cancelled between 1972 and 1982, 88 were being built by privately-owned utilities. EIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 17. The issue of how taxpayers are affected by the cost allocation
decision is beyond the scope of this Article.
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mission ratemaking decisions, issued over the last five years, allocating the costs of nuclear plants cancelled by investor-owned electric
utilities.
I. THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS

The absence of competition in electric utility service areas led
states to establish independent regulatory commissions to oversee
utility activities and to protect the interests of the public. 4 The primary duty of such commissions is to ensure adequate service to the
public at minimum cost, while providing a reasonable return for
investors.1 5
Regulatory commissions draw their authority from statutes enacted by the states or the federal government.1 6 Although often
called independent,1 7 state and federal regulatory commissions are
generally creatures of their respective legislatures, having only those
powers granted by enabling legislation.18 Commissions are usually
granted authority in general terms, but legislation may restrict a
commission's discretion with regard to specific issues.19
Each state has a regulatory commission to oversee the activities
of utilities. 20 Regulatory powers of commissions vary from state to
state.21 Generally, however, they include the authority to: (1) issue
licenses, franchises, or permits for the initiation of service and for
the construction or abandonment of facilities; (2) approve rate
changes; (3) control the quantity and quality of service provided; and
(4) prescribe uniform systems of accounts. 2
14. K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 62-63
(1982).
15. Id. at 62.
16. C.F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 136 (1984).
17. Theoretically, these commissions enjoy a high degree of independence from the other
branches of government. The commissions are bipartisan in nature, with no more than a simple majority having the same political affiliation. Commissioners serve lengthy terms in office,
usually four to ten years, and removing commissioners from office is extremely difficult. Independence from the political branches of government, continuity, expertise, flexibility, and impartiality are commonly cited as advantages of utility regulation by commission. See K. HOWE
& E, RASMUSSEN, supra note 14, at 150-51; C.F. PHILLIPS, JR., supra note 16, at 132-33.
18. C.F. PHILLIPS, JR., supra note 16, at 136.

19. See Infra notes 108-30 and accompanying text.
20,

K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 14, at 149, 155-56; C.F. PHILLIPS, JR., supra

note 16, at 117. Note, however, that the Nebraska Public Service Commission does not have
jurisdiction over electric utilities. See Id. at 118.
21. C.F. PHILLIPS, JR., supra note 16, at 117.
22. Id. In some states, utilities are required to obtain a certificate of public convenience
and necessity from the state regulatory commission before beginning construction on a new
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In addition to state regulation of electric utilities, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is charged with regulating
the sale of electric energy for resale and the transmission of electric
energy in interstate commerce. 3 These activities are subject to
FERC jurisdiction rather than the jurisdiction of the various state
regulatory commissions.24
A.

Rate Determination

Regulatory commissions devote most of their time and energy to
the task of rate regulation.2 5 Rate determination is essentially a twostep process. First, the commission must determine the utility's "revenue requirement" - the amount of revenue to which the utility is
entitled for providing service to the public.2 6 Second, the commission
must devise a rate structure establishing the prices to be charged to
27
the various segments of the public that receive service.
The utility's revenue requirement is determined by calculating

its cost of service.28 The utility's cost of service is the sum of its
operating expenses,
taxes, and the return allowed investors on the
29

"rate base."

The rate base is composed primarily of the utility's

plant. Such a certificate is issued if the commission finds that the proposed plant is necessary,
i.e., needed to meet future demand. The requirement that utilities obtain a certificate of public
convenience and necessity for construction of new plant and facilities is basic to public regulation of monopoly service-providers. The purpose of the certificate requirement is to compel the
applicant-utility to demonstrate its projected ability to continue to provide adequate and reliable service at just and reasonable rates. Id. at 475. In some states, however, the regulatory
commission need not grant prior approval of new plant construction. These states adhere to the
belief that such a decision is best made by utility management. Pierce, The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Cancelled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REv.
497, 532 (1984).
Construction of nuclear power plants must also be licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). The NRC was established in 1974, when the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) was abolished, and assumed the AEC's duties of licensing and regulating civilian use of
nuclear energy. C.F. PHILLIPS, JR., supra note 16, at 127.
23. K. HowE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 14, at 149, 154; C.F. PHILLIPS, JR., supra
note 16, at 127.
24. Concurrent jurisdiction in the area of utility regulation led to jurisdictional conflicts
between state and federal regulatory commissions. Congress attempted to alleviate these
problems by explicitly outlining the extent of federal authority in legislation. See C.F. PHIL-

supra note 16, at 142-46.
25. K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 14, at 63.
26. Id. See R. MORIN, UTILITIES' COST OF CAPITAL 5 (1984).

LIPS, JR.,

27. K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 14, at 63. See R. MORIN, supra note 26, at
5.Typical customer classes for electric utilities are residential, commercial, and industrial. K.
HOWE

28.

& E.

RASMUSSEN,

supra note 14, at 111.

K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 14, at 64; R. MORIN, supra note 26, at 5.

29. K. HOWE & E.

RASMUSSEN,

supra note 14, at 64-65; R. MORIN, supra note 26, at 5.
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investment in plant service."0 The formula used for determining the
utility's revenue requirement can be expressed as follows: RR=O +
T + (V - D)R, where RR represents the revenue requirement; 0,
the operating expenses and annual depreciation; T, the annual taxes;
V, the value of the utility plant; D, the accumulated depreciation;
and R, the allowed rate of return. 31 The expression (V - D) repre32
sents the rate base.
Procedures used for determining rates vary among commissions. 33 Generally, a commission will select a recent "test" year and
examine the revenues, costs, and rate base of the test period.3 4 Only
reasonable and ordinary costs are considered in ratemaking; 5 imprudent or unnecessary costs and costs associated with illegal activities
are not considered. 6 Extraordinary revenues and costs incurred in
the test year are "normalized. 3 7 During the ratemaking process,
30. K. HowE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 14, at 88. See R. MORIN, supra note 26, at
5.Rate base also includes investment for working capital and certain plant held for future use.
K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 14, at 88. Another important item included in rate
base is the allowance for funds used during construction (AFUDC). The AFUDC is the utility's cost of capital used to finance construction of the plant and other overhead construction
costs. Id. at 92; C.F. PHILLIPS, JR., supra note 16, at 322-23. AFUDC is determined by imputing an interest charge to the funds a utility has invested in construction of a new project, based
on the utility's average cost of capital. That amount is then capitalized, i.e., treated as part of
the plant's total cost to be included in rate base, and is recovered from ratepayers. In addition,
AFUDC also appears as a non-cash credit on the utility's income statement. Thus, AFUDC
increases both the utility's reported net income and the cost of the project. Cook, supra note 1,
at 94.
Problems developed as a result of this accounting treatment of AFUDC, due to the rising
costs of capital and construction, and lengthy construction periods for new plants. The
AFUDC accounts of utilities became extremely large. As a result, since the pay-out ratio of a
utility is very high (usually over 50%), utilities were forced to borrow funds to pay dividends
on paper earnings. The resulting cash flow problems led many commissions to allow all or part
of construction work in progress (CWIP) to be included in rate base. The circumstances under
which commissions allow CWIP in rate base, and the amounts allowed, vary widely among
jurisdictions. C.F. PHILLIPS, JR., supra note 16, at 323-25. Inclusion of CWIP in rate base may
lead to the inclusion of plant that is not used and useful. Thus, many jurisdictions do not
include CWIP in rate base. K. HowE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 14, at 92.
31. K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 14, at 64-65. See R. MORIN, supra note 26,
at 6.
32. K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 14, at 65.
33. Id. at 63.
34. Id. at 63, 70. See R. MoRIN, supra note 26, at 5. Not all utilities use historical test
year data in ratemaking. In recent years, some commissions have begun to use "forecast" or
"forward" test year data in order to cope with the problem of rapid inflation. Use of historical
test periods is still the prevalent practice, however. See K. HowE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note
14, at 71; R. MORIN, supra note 26, at 5.
35. K. HowE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 14, at 74.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 75.
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commissions adjust test year data as changes in utility costs become
known or are more accurately anticipated.3 8 The commission compares the revenue earned by the utility in the test year with the revenue requirement as determined above, and adjusts the rate structure
to generate the required revenue.3 9 These rates remain in effect until
the commission decides that changes need to be made.4 °
Although the rate determination theory and equation seem simple to understand, ratemaking is a difficult task because of the controversies and problems involved in determining the values to be assigned to the equation's component parts.4 1 For purposes of
allocating nuclear plant cancellation costs, the crucial variable in the
rate determination equation is rate base. Investment and cancellation
costs of abandoned nuclear plants are designated as extraordinary
property losses on the utility's books.4 2 Such costs are allocated to
ratepayers when utilities are allowed to amortize these losses as a
charge against income over a reasonable number of years. 43 Thus,
they are recovered by the utility as a cost of service. 44 Utility shareholders also share in these losses if they forgo a return on the unamortized balance of these costs, i.e., if the unamortized balance of
these costs is excluded from rate base and the regulatory commission
disallows any carrying charges on the unamortized balance.45 The
crucial questions in allocating nuclear plant cancellation costs for an
investor-owned utility are whether the principal payments will be recovered through amortization and whether the unamortized balance
of these costs should be included in rate base.
B.

The Cost Allocation Decision

Two tests have traditionally been used by commissions for determining whether or not a utility's investment in new plant should
be included in rate base: the prudent investment test and the used
and useful test. 46 Under the prudent investment test, if a utility
38.

See id. at 74; R.

MORIN,

supra note 26, at 5.

39. K. HowE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 14, at 63.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 65. A discussion of the numerous issues and controversies involved in giving
numerical values to all the variables in the rate determination equation is beyond the scope of

this Article. For an exhaustive treatment of the subject, see id. at 76-109.
42. Sommers, Recovery of Electric Utility Losses. From Abandoned Construction
Projects, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 363, 364 (1982).
43. See id.

44. See id.
45.
46.

See id. at 364-65.
Pierce, supra note 22, at 511.
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makes an investment that is imprudent in light of information that
was reasonably available to management at the time the investment
decision was made, all costs associated with that decision are disallowed in determining rates. 47 It is rare for a commission to disallow
all or a substantial part of a utility's investment as imprudent.48
A second test for determining whether utility investment in
plant construction can be included in the rate base is the used and
useful test.49 Under this test, only the costs of plants that are actually used and useful to the utility in providing service are included in
the rate base.50 The used and useful test excludes from rate base
plants that are not yet providing service, and also requires the removal of undepreciated capital costs from rate base where plants are
no longer used due to obsolescence.51 While these two tests are most
often used by commissions for determining rate base treatment of
operating plant, they are also used to calculate the rate base treatment of abandoned plant.5
The costs associated with nuclear plant cancellation fall into
four categories: (1) the direct cash payments the utility has made up
to the time of abandonment for land, site improvements, labor,
materials, engineering and environmental studies, and licenses and
permits; (2) the costs incurred by the utility to raise the capital necessary to construct the plant, often called allowance for funds used
during construction (AFUDC); 53 (3) any contract cancellation penalties; and (4) costs incurred in discontinuing construction, minus
salvage value. 4
A number of cost allocation options are available to regulatory
commissions in the case of an investor-owned utility. From a ratepayer's perspective, these options can be grouped into three categories.5 First, the commission can allow all the cancellation costs to be
47. Id.
48. Id. at 511-12, 512 n.78. But see Cook, supra note 1, at 89 (the New York Public
Service Commission proposes disallowance of $1.9 billion of the Shoreham plant's $4.2 billion
in construction costs).
49. Pierce, supra note 22, at 512.

50. Id.
51. Id. at 512-13. Note, however, that the used and useful test will not necessarily exclude CWIP from rate base. See C.F. PHILLIPS, JR., supra note 16, at 324 n.153.
52. See Pierce, supra note 22, at 517.
53. See supra note 30.
54. EIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 33, 37-38. Salvage value is the amount the utility will
realize from the sale of the site materials, equipment, and land. Id. at 37-38.
55. EIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 39.
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recouped from ratepayers through future rate increases.5 6 Thus, investors are allowed to earn a return on the entire unamortized balance of the cancellation costs.5 7 Taxpayers also benefit from this cost
allocation option since taxes must be paid on the earned return. 8
Second, the commission can completely disallow the costs of the
abandoned plant for ratemaking purposes.5 9 This option forces utility
investors and taxpayers to absorb the entire cost 60 No recovery is
allowed from ratepayers.61 Under this option, the utility will write
off the costs of the abandoned plant as an extraordinary loss in the
year of cancellation. 2 The share of the costs borne by investors 63
is
write-off.
the
by
generated
savings
tax
of
amount
reduced by the
Thus, under this option, the cancellation costs are actually shared
between investors and taxpayers.
Third, cancellation costs can be shared among all three groups
ratepayers, investors, and taxpayers.6 4 This option allows only a
partial recovery of cancellation costs from ratepayers. This is the
most complex of the cost allocation methods and has many variations.6 5 The distinguishing features of each variation are the degree
of return on the unamortized balance of cancellation costs allowed
investors, the portion of cancellation costs recoverable from ratepayers and the length of the amortization period. 6 The most common
variation is to allow amortization of all the cancellation costs over a
period of one to twenty years, while not allowing any return to investors on the unamortized balance on the grounds that the abandoned
plant will never be used and useful.67 The longer the amortization
period, the greater the portion of the abandonment costs borne by
the investors since they forgo a return on the unamortized balance of
these costs during that period.6 8 This option thus allocates the burden of cancellation costs among ratepayers, investors, and
56. Id.
57.

Id.

58. Id.
59.

Id. at 40.

60. Id.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

65. Id.
66.
67.
68.

See id. at 40-43.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 41.
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taxpayers.6 "
Other variations of the partial recovery method of cost allocation 0 preclude investors from earning a return on all or a portion of
the unamortized balance of cancellation costs, 71 while disallowing recovery of all or a portion of these costs from ratepayers,7 2 thus shifting the burden of cancellation costs among the three groups.
The remainder of this Article will survey some representative
cases and some of the factors, including state legislation, that have
influenced the cost allocation decision.
II.

STATE CANCELLATION POLICIES

A recent survey by the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) paints a general picture of state cancellation policies. 73 Most state commissions reported that they permit
utilities to recover some or all of their cancellation costs from ratepayers, and only a handful completely disallow such cost recovery. 4
69. For a detailed explanation of the taxpayer's share of the cancellation costs under this
cost allocation option see Id. at 41-43.
70. See Id. at 42-43. The EIA lists five other variations of the partial recovery option.
71. Option 3 in the EIA REPORT precludes investors from earning a return on the portion of the unamortized balance attributed to common equity financing, while option 2 precludes a return on the portion attributed to both common and preferred equity financing. Id. at
40, 42-43.
72. Option 4 in the EIA REPORT provides that the portion of AFUDC attributed to
common equity financing is not recoverable from ratepayers, and that no return is allowed on
the unamortized balance of cancellation costs. Option 5 provides that the portion of AFUDC
attributed to common equity financing is not recoverable from ratepayers, and that a return is
allowed investors only on the portion of the unamortized balance of cancellation costs not
attributed to AFUDC. Option 6 provides no recovery of AFUDC from ratepayers and no
return on the unamortized balance of cancellation costs attributed to AFUDC. Of the six
options listed in the EIA REPORT, option 6 places the greatest burden on investors. Id. at 4043.
73.
AND

1984 ANNUAL REPORT ON UTILITY
591-92 (1985) [hereinafter cited as 1984 ANNUAL REPORT]. The

NAT'L ASS'N OF REGULATORY UTIL COMM'RS,

CARRIER REGULATION

survey was originally published in Public Utilities Fortnightly, March 31, 1983. NARUC republishes and updates this survey on an annual basis by soliciting the views of its members, the
state regulatory commissions. The most recent NARUC survey reflects state policies through
January 1, 1985.
In addition to the NARUC surveys, the Edison Electric Institute has issued periodic reports on nuclear plant cancellation issues. EDISON ELEC. INST.. REGULATORY TREATMENT OF
CANCELLED PLANTS, SURVEY UPDATE OF CASES IN 1983 (Mar. 1984).
74. 1984 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 591-92. Thirty-five state commissions responded to the most recent NARUC survey. Twenty-nine reported that they permitted utilities
to recover some or all of their cancellation costs from ratepayers; six reported complete disallowance of cost recovery. The six were Arizona, Iowa, Montana, New Hampshire, Georgia and
Ohio. Id.
The NARUC survey also revealed that twenty-six state commissions had directed that
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Thus, utilities are most often able to add up their recoverable costs,
amortize these costs over a period of years and collect, as an expense

item in each year, their share of the costs on a straight-line basis.75
However, only a few of the state commissions allowing cost recovery

permit utilities to add some
or all of the unamortized balance of
76
costs to their rate bases.
A.

State Commission Decisions to Permit Cost Recovery: The
Balancing of Interests

The allocation of plant cancellation costs requires an equitable
balancing of investor and ratepayer interests. 7 The state commissions permitting recovery of abandonment costs have resorted to various methods in their attempts to achieve this balance. 7s The individual variations in each case typically concern the types of costs

which are recoverable, the length of the amortization period, 79 and
the degree of managerial prudence required in the construction and
cancellation decisions. s0 Frequently, all of these factors come into
utilities amortize their abandonment costs over a period of years. Eleven of these twenty-six
states chose a ten-year amortization period in at least one cancellation case. Id.
75. A simple example: a utility cancels a nuclear construction project in which it has
invested $50 million in recoverable costs. Under the majority practice, the utility is permitted
to recover $5 million per year for ten years from its ratepayers as a return of capital. At no
time, however, may the utility add any of the $50 million to its rate base. The utility is thereby
precluded from earning a return on its capital investment. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
76. 1984 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 591-92. Four states reported that they had
permitted utilities to add some or all of the unamortized balance of costs to the rate base. The
four were Florida, Oklahoma, New York and Vermont. Id.
The state commissions were also asked if they permitted utilities to recover the cancellation costs representing AFUDC. See supra note 30. Sixteen states reported that they did permit AFUDC to be recovered in rates. Massachusetts and Oklahoma, however, said that they
excluded a return on the common equity portion of unamortized costs. 1984 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 73, at 591-92. The rationale for this exclusion is that to fail to do so would remove
"the inherent risk factor associated with the return on common equity." In re Western Mass.
Elec. Co., No. 558 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils. 1981):
77. See In re Carolina Power & Light Co., 49 P.U.R.4th 188, 248 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n
1982); In re Boston Edison Co., 46 P.U.R.4th 431, 435 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils. 1982), aftd
sub nom. Attorney Gen. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 390 Mass. 208, 455 N.E.2d 414 (1983).
78. See supra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
79. Focusing on the appropriate amortization period highlights the inherent conflict between the goals of minimizing the cost impact on consumers, and preserving the financial
health of the utility. The impact on consumers decreases as the period of amortization increases, by allowing the costs to be spread out over a longer period of time; conversely, the
financial health of the utility improves with a shorter amortization period.
80. The prudence inquiry is a fact-laden exercise in which a commission assesses, among
other issues, the reasonableness of the utility's demand forecasts, its choice of competing technologies, and the economic basis of the nuclear option ultimately chosen. The timing of the
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play simultaneously.
For example, in In re Boston Edison Co.,81 the Massachusetts

Department of Public Utilities (MDPU) made a cost allocation decision based on three basic principles: (1) the prudence of the utility's
actions; (2) the fairness of any proposed allocation; and (3) the need
to adjust the financial impact of any allocation to ensure the adequacy of future service.8 2 The case concerned the abandoned Pilgrim
1I nuclear power plant.
On the issue of managerial prudence, the MDPU found that the
utility's decision to begin construction of the plant was prudent, but
that it was imprudent for the utility to postpone its cancellation decision as long as it did."3 Stating that a standard of perfection is unrealistic, the MDPU based its findings on "how reasonable individuals would have responded to the particular circumstances and
whether the company's actions were prudent in light of all conditions
should
and circumstances which were known or which reasonably
8' 4
have been known at the time the decisions were made."
A combination of factors had led Boston Edison to put Pilgrim
II on hold in June, 1980. These factors included uncertainty as to
when or if a construction permit could be procured, extension of the
project's duration, increased cost estimates and, consequently, the
evaporation of the value of a 500 million dollar loan.85 The utility
ultimately cancelled the project in September, 1982.6 The MDPU,
however, found that the risks associated with Pilgrim II had become
intolerably high by June, 1980, and that this should have led the
utility to cancel the project instead of putting it on hold. s7 The
MDPU therefore held that Boston Edison could recover costs incurred before July 1, 1980, but, based on its prior practice, the eqcancellation decision itself may also be reviewed to assess utility prudence. See EIA

REPORT,

supra note 7, at 39; C.F. PHILLIPS, JR., supra note 16, at 292-99.

81. 46 P.U.R.4th 431 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils. 1982), aifd sub nom. Attorney Gen. v.
Department of Pub. Utils., 390 Mass. 208, 455 N.E.2d 414 (1983).
82. Id. at 461.
83. Id. at 437, 470.
84. Id. at 438. Other cases discussing managerial prudence include In re Detroit Edison
Co., 52 P.U.R.4th 318 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983); In re Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp., 52
P.U.R.4th 389 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983); In re Atlantic City Elec. Co., 51 P.U.R.4th
109 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Utils. 1983); In re Houston Lighting & Power Co., 50 P.U.R.4th 157
(Tex. P.U.C. 1982); In re Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 44 P.U.R.4th 54 (N.J. Bd. Pub.
Utils. 1982); and In re Northern States Power Co., 42 P.U.R.4th 339 (Minn. P.U.C. 1981).
85. In re Boston Edison Co., 46 P.U.R.4th at 470.
86. Id. at 471.
87. Id. at 470 (footnote omitted).
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uity component of AFUDC would be excluded from amortizable
costs.88 Based upon the assessment of risks to shareholders and ratepayers, the need to maintain stable rate levels and the utility's cur-

rent and future need to raise capital, the MDPU ordered that the
recoverable costs be amortized over a period of thirteen years without addition of unamortized amounts to the rate base.8

In 1982, the MDPU reviewed a request by another utility to
recover its Pilgrim II cancellation costs. In In re Commonwealth
Electric Co.,90 the MDPU relied heavily on its decision in Boston
Edison. In fact, the MDPU imputed Boston Edison's managerial imprudence in failing to cancel the project in June, 1980 to Commonwealth Electric. 91 Like Boston Edison, Commonwealth Electric was
permitted to recover its share of the cancellation costs incurred prior

to July 1, 1980, excluding the common equity component of
AFUDC. 92 However, because Commonwealth Electric's costs were

significantly lower, a two-year amortization schedule was found to be
appropriate.9 3

88. Id. at 471-72. See supra note 75. By addressing recovery of AFUDC, the Commission, in effect, removed from recoverable costs those costs incurred by the utility in raising
common equity capital to construct the plant. See supra note 30. By disallowing equity components of AFUDC, the Commission denied shareholders any return during the construction
period.
Boston Edison Co. had incurred cancellation costs totaling $278 million. 46 P.U.R.4th at
471. The exclusion of costs incurred after June, 1980 and the equity component of AFUDC,
left a total of $204 million to be recovered through rates. Id. at 474.
89. Id. at 471-73. By denying rate base treatment, the Commission disallowed shareholder profits in the future. However, the MDPU did authorize Boston Edison to recover carrying costs on the unamortized amounts at a rate of 14%. Id. at 472. The MDPU also directed
that the utility subtract $85 million in tax benefits attributable to the cancellation costs, which
ultimately gave Boston Edison an annual amortization of $12.7 million. Id. at 474.
90. 47 P.U.R.4th 229 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils. 1982). Unlike Boston Edison, the lead
participant in the Pilgrim II project, Commonwealth Electric had minimal exposure to the
cancellation costs. The utility requested recovery of only $7.2 million. Id. at 234.
91. 47 P.U.R.4th at 235. The MDPU stated: "[W]e impute [this liability to Commonwealth Electric] on what we consider to be sound legal and policy grounds. . . .[A]ll participants, and thus their respective ratepayers and investors, should be treated uniformly, and not
differently, by their regulators." Id.
The MDPU took special note of the agreement entered into by the utilities participating
in the Pilgrim II project. The agreement provided for joint ownership, construction and operation of Pilgrim II, with each participant giving a broad grant of authority to Boston Edison,
the lead participant. The agreement discussed the possibility of termination of the project. In
such an event, it was agreed that the costs would be shared in proportion to each participant's
ownership percentage. Id. at 235-36.
92. Id. at 236-37.
93. Id. at 237. After excluding costs incurred after July 1, 1980 and the common equity
component of AFUDC, Commonwealth Electric had a total of $3.1 million in recoverable
costs which could be amortized over two years with no carrying charges for the unamortized
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Another variable that state commissions take into account is the
treatment of unamortized costs. For example, in two decisions concerning Harris Units 3 and 4, the North Carolina Utilities Commission grappled with the issue of whether a utility should be allowed a
return on unamortized balances through additions to rate base. Its
first decision, In re Carolina Power & Light Co.,94 permitted that
portion of the utility's unamortized balance which was supported by
long-term debt to be included in rate base.95 One year later, the
Commission modified its order to disallow any rate base treatment of
the utility's unamortized balances. 9 The Commission, foreseeing
that it would continue to be confronted with the problem in the future, undertook this reexamination "in order to develop a more consistent and equitable approach. 97 The Commission concluded that
the most equitable way to allocate these losses between the utility
and the consumer was to exclude any portion of the unamortized
balance from rate base treatment.98 This would represent the "middle ground,"9 9 in which shareholders would receive a return on capital invested in cancelled plant, while ratepayers would not be forced
to provide a profit on the investment. 100
The previous cases are examples of various state commissions
considering cancellation questions in utility-specific proceedings. In
amounts. Id. at 236-37.
The Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control has also permitted recovery for
Pilgrim II cancellation costs. In re United Illuminating Co., 55 P.U.R.4th 252, 268 (Conn.
Dep't Pub. Util. Control 1983)(two-year amortization period, no rate base treatment or carrying charges). The Vermont Public Service Board similarly permitted recovery. In re Central
Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 49 P.U.R.4th 372, 392 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. 1982)(ten-year amortization
period, no rate base treatment or carrying charges).
94. 49 P.U.R.4th 188 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n 1982).
95. Id. at 216-20.
96. In re Carolina Power & Light Co., 55 P.U.R.4th 582, 601 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n
1983).
97. Id. at 600.
98. Id. at 601.
99. Id. at 601. The Commission concluded:
It would be inequitable to place the entire loss of expenditures that were prudent
when made on the utility. . . . [O]n the other hand, the ratepayer must not bear the
entire risk of the company's investment. A middle ground must be found on which
the company bears some of the risk of abandonment and the ratepayer is protected
from unreasonably high rates.

Id.
100. Id. In subsequent cases, the North Carolina Utilities Commission reaffirmed this
policy of not allowing rate base treatment for unamortized costs. See In re Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., Docket No. E-22, Sub. 273 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n Dec. 5, 1983); In re Duke Power
Co., Docket No. E-7, Sub. 358 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n Sept. 30, 1983).
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In re Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.,10 1 however, the New York

Public Service Commission used a plant-specific approach when it
treated, simultaneously, the cancellation costs incurred by four utili-

ties in the Sterling plant. 10 2 Guided by general ratemaking and accounting principles, the impact of cost recovery on consumers and
the financial condition of each utility, the Commission established a
separate amortization schedule for each of the Sterling utilities." °
The individual determinations depended on each utility's relative exposure to the cancellation costs and how the costs incurred compared

to the utility's total revenues. 04 Each utility was also permitted to

recover carrying charges on its share of the unamortized balances to
be computed on the basis of each utility's overall cost of capital.1 05
The decision in In re Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. illustrates that

even when a plant-specific approach is employed, the actual decisionmaking will depend on utility-specific consideration of all the factors
involved in the cancellation decision and the nature and magnitude
of the cancellation costs.

B.

The Impact of State Legislation

Several state courts and commissions based cost allocation deci-

sions on local statutes regulating public utilities and the ratemaking
101. 45 P.U.R.4th 386 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1982).
102. Id. at 387. The four utilities involved were Rochester Gas and Electric Corp., Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc., Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp., and Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. All were parties to the proceeding. Id. In the interest of expeditiously
resolving the matter, the Commission rejected the normal procedure of deferring the cost recovery question until each utility's next rate case. Id. at 410-11.
103. 45 P.U.R.4th at 408-10. The Commission stated that the amortization periods need
not correspond to the projected 30-year useful life of the Sterling plant. It reasoned that a long
amortization would ultimately increase ratepayer contributions, increase investor risk and, consequently, the cost of future capital. Id. at 408. See supra note 79.
104. 45 P.U.R.4th at 408-10. For example, Niagara Mohawk was granted a three-year
amortization period due to the small impact its share of the costs would have on its rates and
its financial condition. Central Hudson, due to its relatively large stake in Sterling and the
need to maintain its financial integrity, was granted a five-year amortization period. Orange
and Rockland, deemed to be financially strongest of the four utilities, was assigned a ten-year
amortization period in order to minimize rate impact. Rochester Gas and Electric, despite
being the most deeply involved in the project, was granted a five-year amortization period in
order to provide sufficient cash flow for the utility to meet its "ambitious construction program." 45 P.U.R.4th at 410.
105. Id. at 410-11. The New York Public Service Commission later reported to
NARUC that permitting a utility to recover carrying charges on unamortized balances at its
overall cost of capital is functionally equivalent to allowing rate base treatment for these balances. See 1984 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 582-83. See also In re Financing Plans
for N.Y. State Gas & Elec. Cos., 49 P.U.R.4th 329 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1982).
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process. These statutes generally take two forms: anti-CWIP stat-

utes,"0 8 and other various statutory provisions incorporating the con107
cept of "used and useful" property.
1. Anti-CWIP Statutes. -

One type of regulatory statute that

some courts and commissions
have relied on to deny recovery is the
"anti-CWIP" statute,108 which typically prohibits a utility from
placing into its rate base the capitalized costs of raising funds to
construct a plant, prior to the time the plant becomes operational.109
In In re Public Service Co.,110 the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire analyzed that state's anti-CWIP statute 11 at the request
of the state commission. The court, in its declaratory ruling, strictly
construed the statute's broad regulatory mandate that rates may not

be based on construction costs "if said construction work is not completed."' 1

2

Consequently, the court declared that the state commis-

sion could not, as a matter of law, permit the utility to recover its
investment in the abandoned Pilgrim II nuclear plant through amortization or rate base treatment.11 The court, however, left open the
106. See infra notes 109-30 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 131-75 and accompanying text. State commissions have occasionally denied cost recovery on procedural grounds as well. For example, in In re Arizona Pub.
Serv. Co., 38 P.U.R.4th 547 (Ariz. Corp. Comm'n 1980), the Arizona Commission denied
recovery for costs associated with the cancelled Palo Verde Units IV and V. The Commission
found that the utility had not met its burden of justifying its claim for recovery with sufficient
evidence. Id. at 556.
108. CWIP is an acronym for "construction work in progress." See K HowE & E.
RAsMuSSEN, supra note 14, at 92.
109. See C.F. PHILLIPS, JR., supra note 16, at 322-27. Thus, the utility is prohibited
from earning a return on the costs of construction until the plant is completed. See, e.g., Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 393.135 (Vernon Supp. 1986); N.H. REv.STAT. ANN. § 378-.30-a (1984); 66 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1315 (Purdon Supp. 1985). In an anti-CWIP jurisdiction, the utility
capitalizes its construction costs during the construction process and then generally adds the
capitalized amount to the total cost of the plant to be figured into rate base when the plant is
completed. See C.F. PHILLIPS, JR., supra note 16, at 322-27.

l10. 125 N.H. 46, 480 A.2d 20 (1984).
Ill. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-.30-a (1984). New Hampshire's anti-CWIP statute
provides:
Public utility rates or charges shall not in any manner be based on the cost of construction work in progress. At no time shall any rates or charges be based upon any
costs associated with construction work if said construction work is not completed.
All costs of construction work in progress, including, but not limited to, any costs
associated with constructing, owning, maintaining or financing construction work in
progress, shall not be included in a utility's rate base nor be allowed as an expense
for rate making purposes until, and not before, said construction project is actually
providing service to consumers.
Id.
il2. Id. See 125 N.H. at 52-55, 480 A.2d at 23-25.
113, 125 N.H. at 55, 480 A.2d at 25.
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question of whether the costs could be recovered indirectly from
14
ratepayers through the establishment of a higher rate of return.'

A similar result was reached when the Missouri Public Service
Commission interpreted that state's anti-CWIP statute,"1 5 in In re
Union Electric Co." 6 At the time, there was no Missouri case law to
guide the Commission in interpreting the recent statute and it consequently approached the task with great caution."1 In particular, the

Commission feared that if it read the statute to allow recovery by
the utility, and its decision was subsequently reversed on appeal, the

ratepayers would be placed in the position of temporarily paying
rates based on unlawful charges with no assurance of a refund. 18 To
The MDPU also dealt with Pilgrim II cancellation costs. Recovery was permitted. See
supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text. Massachusetts, however, has no regulatory statutes
restricting the scope of recovery. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire was keenly aware of
this distinction: "The legislature of Massachusetts has left its commission with the delegated
discretion to determine the policy on investment in cancelled plants. The legislature of New
Hampshire divested its commission of any discretion in this matter when it passed [the antiCWIP statute]." 125 N.H. at 57, 480 A.2d at 27.
It is interesting to note that, in the Boston Edison case, one of the arguments advanced
for denial of recovery was that the MDPU had previously employed a used and useful test to
determine which capital investments belong in the rate base. 46 P.U.R.4th 431, 434-36 (Mass.
Dep't Pub. Utils. 1982), afl'd sub nom. Attorney Gen. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 390 Mass.
208, 455 N.E.2d 414 (1983). In these cases, the utility was found not to be entitled to a return
on its investment in property that was not used or useful in providing service to customers. See
Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 375 Mass. 571, 380 N.E.2d 1304
(1978); Boston Edison Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 375 Mass. 1, 375 N.E.2d 305, cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 921 (1978); Boston Gas Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 367 Mass. 92, 324
N.E.2d 372 (1975). The MDPU, however, dismissed these regulatory precedents, stating that
"an extraordinary loss of this size requires separate, independent, and unique rules that properly reflect the just balance of the affected interests." 46 P.U.R.4th at 435.
Many states have incorporated the "used and useful" concept into their regulatory statutes. See infra text accompanying notes 131-75.
114. 125 N.H. at 55, 480 A.2d at 26. For a discussion of indirect recovery, see infra
notes 162-78 and accompanying text.
115. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 393.135 (Vernon Supp. 1986). Missouri's anti-CWIP statute
provides:
Any charge made or demanded by an electrical corporation for service, or in connection therewith, which is based on the costs of construction in progress upon any
existing or new facility of the electrical corporation, or any other cost associated
with owning, operating, maintaining, or financing any property before it is fully
operational and used for service, is unjust and unreasonable, and is prohibited.
Id.
116. 57 P.U.R.4th 169 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983).
117. Id. at 172. In fact, the Missouri Commission stated that it regretted that there was
no procedural means to avoid the issue, by getting a declaratory judgment from the courts like
the New Hampshire Commission did in In re Public Serv. Co.. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
118. 57 P.U.R.4th at 172.
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avoid this possibility, and with the recognition that any decision it

reached would be appealed, the Missouri Commission decided to
take the prohibitory language of the statute at face value, denying

any recovery to the utility.

19 Thus,

the Commission decided to pre-

serve the status quo pending the inevitable appeal to the Missouri

1 20
Supreme Court.
The appeal finally reached the Supreme Court of Missouri in

State ex rel. Union Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission.1 2

The court held that the statute did not, as a matter of law, divest the
Missouri Commission of the authority to allow recovery for costs of
abandoned construction.1 22 The decision rested in part on a comparison of the Missouri and New Hampshire statutes.1 23 The court noted

that while the two statutes are similar in many respects, the New
Hampshire statute contains the following additional language, which
directly relates to abandoned construction: "At no time shall any
rates or charges be based upon any costs associated with construction work if said construction work is not completed. ....

The

125
Missouri statute contains no analogous reference to cancellation.
Thus, the court reasoned, the possibility of abandoned construction
was not contemplated by its sponsors. 26 The court concluded that

the statute merely addresses the timing of the recovery of normal
1 27
construction costs for projects that are eventually completed.
The court apparently sought to avoid the consequences of con-

struing the statute to deny any cost recovery, since an increase in the
119. Id.at 173.
120. Id. at 172.
121. 687 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. 1985)(en banc).
122. Id. at 168.
123. Id.at 167. See supra notes Il1 & 115.
124. 687 S.W.2d at 167. See supra note I11.
125. 687 S.W.2d at 167-68. See supra note 115.
126. 687 S.W.2d at 166.
127. See id.
The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission similarly rejected a strict construction of that state's anti-CWIP statute, in Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Duquesne
Light Co., 52 P.U.R.4th 644 (Pa. P.U.C. 1983). The statute provides, in pertinent part:
The cost of construction or expansion of a facility undertaken by a public utility producing, generating, transmitting, distributing, or furnishing electricity shall
not be made a part of the rate base nor otherwise included in the rates charged by
the electric utility until such time as the facility is used and useful in service to the
public. Except as stated in this section, no electric utility property shall be deemed
used and useful until it is presently providing actual utility service to the customers.
66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1315 (Purdon Supp. 1985). The Pennsylvania Commission found
that the statute does not address the cancellation issue, and merely prohibits a utility from
collecting rates to support plant construction, prior to completion of that construction. 52
P.U.R.4th at 650-51.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol13/iss3/1

18

Rodgers and Gray: State Commission Treatment of Nuclear Plant Cancellation Costs

1985]

NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATION

risks of loss in utility investment might make it difficult or impossible to raise the capital necessary to provide adequate service to ratepayers.128 The court suggested that utilities would be reluctant to
embark on new construction projects or other long term plans if it
meant possible forfeiture of the costs at a later date. 12 9
Having determined that the statute did not bar cost recovery as
a matter of law, the court remanded the case to the Missouri Commission for an examination of managerial prudence and the other
factors involved in the cost allocation decision. 30
2. Other State Regulatory Schemes. - In addition to antiCWIP statutes, some state commissions and courts have relied on
the language of general regulatory and ratemaking statutes in making their cost allocation decisions. The kinds of statutory provisions
relied upon are so diverse that it is difficult to determine if these
decisions signify a trend. Most incorporate the concept of "used and
useful" property.' 3' One common factor in the decisions is the use of
general regulatory language as the basis for denying cost recovery.
For example, in In re Pacific Power & Light Co., 3 ' the Montana Public Service Commission relied on a general ratemaking statute authorizing it to investigate and ascertain the value of "used and
useful" property, 133 as the basis for its decision denying cost recovery
for two abandoned nuclear plants. 3 The Montana Commission read
this language to mean that a utility can recover from ratepayers only
the costs of investments in property which are actually used and useful in providing utility service for ratepayers. 35 Since the abandoned
nuclear plants never became used or useful, no recovery was
permitted. 36
The Commission's decision does not consider the likely adverse
economic consequences to the utility. Instead, the decision focuses on
the general fairness concept that ratepayers should not be forced to
pay for a bad decision when they had no part in making it. 31 In128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

687 S.W.2d at 166.
Id.
Id. at 168,
See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
53 P.U.R.4th 24 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983).

133.

MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 69-3-109 (1985). The statute provides:

"The commission

may, in its discretion, investigate-and ascertain the value of the property of every public utility

actually used and useful for the convenience of the public." Id.
134.
135.
136.
137.

53 P.U.R.4th at 27.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 27.
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deed, the Commission openly stated that the risks of investment
must be borne by the shareholder because it is he, through the management he selects, who decides which projects will be pursued. 138
The Commission further stated that to expect the ratepayer to compensate the shareholder for company losses is to guarantee recovery
of shareholder investments. 139
In In re Central Maine Power Co.,140 cost recovery denial was
based on a very different kind of regulatory statute, dealing explicitly with allocating the costs of abandoned plants.1 4 ' The statute was
divided into two parts. The first part prohibited the Commission
from considering cost recovery of abandoned plants "until after the
date last announced for completion of the plant by the lead participant. 14 2 Because this completion date had not yet passed, the Commission stated that it could not, at that time, grant recovery.' 4 3
The Commission then turned to the second part of the statute,
which outlined an exception to the first part if the utility could show
that a denial of recovery would prevent the utility from providing
services or attracting capital. 4 4 The Commission found that, while it
was clear that the utility's investors had suffered a substantial loss,
the utility did not meet its burden of showing that this loss would
impair either utility service or its ability to attract capital. 45 According to the Commission, the financial strain on the utility was due
more to an unrelated construction program than to its investment in
the abandoned nuclear plant.' 46 Thus, because neither element of the
statute had been satisfied, the Commission, as a matter of law, could
138. Id. at 29.
139. Id.
140. 57 P.U.R.4th 488 (Me. P.U.C. 1983). The case concerned the utility's investment
in the abandoned Pilgrim II plant. For other cases involving the allocation of the costs of the
Pilgrim II plant, see supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
141. Act of Sept. 23, 1983, ch. 243, 1983 Me. Laws 561 (repealed 1985). The statute
provided, in pertinent part:
The commission shall not, with respect to any canceled or abandoned electric
generating facility, issue any order concerning the recovery from ratepayers of all or
any portion of the cost of that facility until after the date last announced for completion of the plant by the lead participant. This section does not apply if an electrical company can establish ... that it will be unable to perform its public service or
attract necessary capital on just and reasonable terms ....
Id.
142. Id.
143. 57 P.U.R.4th at 508.
144. See supra note 141.
145. 57 P.U.R.4th at 509.
146. Id. at 509-10.
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not grant cost recovery.' 47
The Maine statute represented an interesting and unusual attempt to balance the risk of loss between investors and ratepayers.

By prohibiting any cost allocation decision on abandoned plants until
the last date announced for completion, 48 it prevented ratepayers
from having to compensate for construction costs, at least until the
time they would have started paying had the construction been com-

pleted. Furthermore, through the "financial health exception,"' 149 the
Maine legislature apparently recognized that a denial of cost recovery can, in some instances, weaken the financial status of a utility to

the point where it can no longer raise new capital. The Maine statute was repealed, however, in favor of an even simpler and more
direct legislative mandate: "In determining the rate-making treatment for a utility's investment in cancelled or abandoned electric

generating facilities, the commission shall balance the interests of
the utility and ratepayers in a just and reasonable manner in each
individual case."' 150

Indiana is the most recent state to interpret provisions of its regulatory legislation to prohibit recovery of abandonment costs. In Cit-

izens Action Coalition v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co.,' a
sharply divided Supreme Court of Indiana held that the utility could
not amortize the cancellation costs of its Bailly N-1 nuclear plant
because, under that state's statutory scheme,
147.
148.

52

a utility's charges

Id. at 507-10.
See supra note 141.

149. Id.
150. ME.

REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 35, § 52-B (Supp. 1985).
151. 485 N.E.2d 610 (Ind. 1985).
152. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1-2-1, -4 (West Supp. 1985). The court first examined § 8-12-4 of the Indiana Code, which provides that: "The charge made by any public utility for
any service rendered or to be rendered either directly or in connection therewith shall be reasonable and just." Id. at 612-13. The court next examined the term "service" as defined in § 81-2-1 of the Indiana Code:
The term "service" is used in this chapter in its broadest and most inclusive sense
and includes not only the use or accommodation afforded consumers or patrons but
also any product or commodity furnished by any public or other utility and the
plant, equipment, apparatus, appliances, property and facility employed by any
public or other utility in performing any service or in furnishing any product or
commodity and devoted to the purposes in which such public or other utility is engaged and to the use and accommodation of the public (emphasis added).
Id. at 613. Taking these two provisions together, the court noted that the costs of plant may be
included in a utility's charge for service. The court was quick to point out, however, that this
did not end the inquiry because, under Indiana law, only property that is used or useful can be
valuated for rate purposes. The court cited no authority for this proposition. 485 N.E.2d at
614. The "used and useful" concept does appear, however, in § 8-1-2-6(a) of the Indiana

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1985

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:443

can only reflect the value of property, plant and equipment that is
used and useful. 153 The court rejected arguments that the state legislature had acquiesced to the practice of permitting cost recovery by
failing to amend the statutes, knowing that amortization had been
permitted for abandoned plants in previous cases.1 54
The dissenters vigorously attacked the decision, which one referred to as "a societal disaster."1 5 The dissenters focused their attentions on the economic realities of the cost allocation decision.
Chief Justice Givan chastized the majority for its naivete in thinking
that shareholders could somehow pay the costs: "It does a disservice to the parties to this litigation and to the public generally to
engage in semantics which tend to build a false picture that in some
manner some of the debts of the corporation will be paid in a manner other than the collection of rates."1 56 According to Chief Justice
Givan, ratepayers are the only source of revenue for a utility157 and,
in reality, no funds are raised by depriving utility shareholders of a
return. 158
Justice Prentice, in dissent, focused on the allocation of risks
between investors and ratepayers.1 59 He opined that it is unrealistic
and unreasonable to expect investors to assume all of the risks when
the ratepayers reap the greatest benefits from utility services.160 The
Justice further noted that "[p]rudent management is the responsibilCode, which provides, in part: "The commission shall value all property of every public utilIND. CODE
ity actually used and useful for the convenience of the public at its fair value .
ANN. § 8-1-2-6(a) (West 1982).
Cf.Office of Util. Consumer Counselor v. Public Serv. Co., 463 N.E.2d 499 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding that the Public Service Commission did not err in finding the excess
capacity generated by a recently completed coal-fired generating facility to be used and useful,
and thus eligible for inclusion in the utility's rate base).
153. Citizens Action Coalition, 485 N.E.2d at 613-17.
154. Id. at 615-16. The court pointed out that only one of the numerous cases cited to
illustrate the past practice had actually permitted cost recovery for an abandoned plant. Id.
See In re Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., No. 35251 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Sept. 21, 1978).
The rest allowed recovery for plants that had been used and useful property but were retired
from service. The court distinguished between this kind of abandonment and the abandonment
of a plant that never became used and useful: "Allowance of amortization of cancelled plants
[that never became used and useful] would encourage uneconomical or unproductive ventures;
whereas, allowance for ... retired plants encourages utilities to remove obsolete plants and
property from the ratebase." Citizens Action Coalition, 485 N.E.2d at 616.
155. Citizens Action Coalition, 485 N.E.2d at 624 (Prentice, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 620 (Givan, C.J., dissenting).
157. Id. (Givan, C.J., dissenting).
158. Id. (Givan, C.J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 623-24 (Prentice, J., dissenting).
160. Id. (Prentice, J., dissenting).
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ity of the investor. Infallible management and the production of utopian services at rates that will please the consumers are not." '
The Citizens Action Coalition opinion is important because it

clearly illustrates the tension between the desire to be fair to ratepayers and the need to avoid adverse economic consequences. The
majority opinion ignores the economic issues associated with the allocation of cancellation costs. By not addressing the likely economic
results, the court implicitly accepts the possibility that services might

be impaired if the utility's financial predicament worsens.
Perhaps the most litigation over cancellation costs occurred in

Ohio. In 1980, a consortium of five utilities operating in Ohio and
Pennsylvania, named the Central Area Power Coordination Group
(CAPCO),'162 decided to terminate the construction of four nuclear
plants."1 3 Each of the Ohio utilities applied to the Ohio Public Utili164
ties Commission for permission to amortize the cancellation costs.
To support their claims for cost recovery, the utilities argued that
ratepayers should pay because the costs were incurred on their be-

half.16 5 The Ohio Commission permitted cost recovery.166
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed in Office of Consumers'
L
Counsel v. Public Utilities Commission (Consumers' Counsel 1). 67
The court held that, under Ohio's regulatory statutes, only "used
and useful" property could be valuated in the determination of

rates. 6 8 The court rejected the argument that the state commission's

161. Id. at 624 (Prentice, J., dissenting).
162. Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 67 Ohio St. 2d 153, 154,
423 N.E.2d 820, 821 (1981), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v.
Office of Consumers' Counsel, 455 U.S. 914 (1982). The five CAPCO utilities were the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., Ohio Edison Co. and Toledo Edison Co., operating in Ohio,
and Duquesne Light Co. and Pennsylvania Power Co., operating in Pennsylvania.
163. Office of Consumers' Counsel, 67 Ohio St. 2d 153, 154, 423 N.E.2d 820, 821
(1981). The four cancelled plants were Davis-Besse Units 2 and 3, and Erie Units 1 and 2. Id.
at 153 n.1, 423 N.E.2d at 821 n.l.
164. In re Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 38 P.U.R.4th 494 (Ohio P.U.C. 1980).
165. Id. at 525-27.
166. Id. at 526-27. In a series of decisions, the Ohio Commission established the following policy with regard to CAPCO cancellation costs: Each utility would be permitted to
amortize its share of costs, including AFUDC, over ten years, but none would be permitted to
earn a return on its unamortized balance through rate base treatment. The Commission stated
that this treatment was in the public interest since the decisions to commence and cancel
construction were prudently made. In re Ohio Edison Co., No. 80-141-EL-AIR (Ohio P.U.C.
Feb. !1, 1981); In re Toledo Edison Co., 42 P.U.R.4th 568, 589-91 (Ohio P.U.C. 1981); In re
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 38 P.U.R.4th 494, 525-27 (Ohio P.U.C. 1980).
167. 67 Ohio St. 2d 153, 423 N.E.2d 820 (Ohio 1981), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Office of Consumers' Counsel, 455 U.S. 914 (1982).
168. Id. at 163-64, 423 N.E.2d at 827. The Ohio statute in effect at the time provided,
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decision was necessary to preserve the financial health of the
CAPCO utilities, noting that if relief of this sort was necessary, the
utilities should approach the legislature to amend the statute. 9
Two years later, one of the utilities returned to the Ohio Su-

preme Court, urging it to reconsider its earlier decision. The court
declined. 170 In a companion decision, however, the court affirmed a
ruling of the state commission that the utility's shareholders should
receive a higher rate of return on equity to reflect the increased risks
to investors caused by the court's Consumers' Counsel I decision. 1
The dissent vigorously argued that this effectively reversed Consumers' Counsel L172
The Ohio CAPCO decisions illustrate the concept of indirect
recovery. The Ohio Commission raised rates based on its authority
to control the rate of return the utility's shareholders should receive.173 This higher rate of return for shareholders was to offset the
increased risks of investment in the utility, caused by the denial of
cost recovery for the abandoned plants.174 Thus, a utility may sometimes collect indirectly, through a higher rate of return on equity,
in part: "The public utilities commission, when fixing and determining just and reasonable
rates . . . shall determine: (1) The valuation as of the date certain of the property of the
public utility used and useful in rendering the public utility service for which rates are to be
fixed and determined." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4909.15(A)(1) (Page 1977).
The statute has since been amended, adding provisions to deal more specifically with
abandoned projects and allowances for CWIP. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4909.15(A)(1)
(Page Supp. 1984).
169. Consumers' Counsel I, 67 Ohio St. 2d at 167, 423 N.E.2d at 829. The statute was
amended, but not in a way that is favorable to utilities abandoning plants. The amendment
provides that if a utility cancels a project for which a CWIP allowance was permitted, the
allowance is excluded from the project's valuation and any revenues collected by the utility as
a result of the prior inclusion of the allowance is offset against future revenues. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4909.15(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1984).
170. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 4 Ohio St. 3d 107, 447
N.E.2d 746 (1983).
Although the nuclear stations cancelled by the CAPCO utilities will never be completed,
a consortium of other Ohio utilities is attempting to convert the proposed Zimmer plant to
coal, to avoid cancelling the plant. The utilities hope to avoid the fate suffered by the CAPCO
utilities. Zimmer Conversion is 'one of a kind,' ELECTRICAL WORLD, Mar. 1985, at 42.
171. Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 4 Ohio St. 3d 111, 447 N.E.2d 749
(1983) (Consumers' Counsel II).
172. Id. at 116-17, 447 N.E.2d at 754-55 (Locher, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 114-15, 447 N.E.2d at 752-54. Return on equity represents the profit to be
provided to utility shareholders in return for their investment in the utility's business. The rate
of return is controlled by state regulatory commissions. See R. MORIN. supra note 26, at 2028. See also text accompanying note 15.
174. Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 4 Ohio St. 3d 111, 114, 447 N.E.2d
749, 753 (1983) (Consumers' Counsel II).
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what it was prohibited from collecting through amortization. Despite
a utility's inability to directly recover abandonment losses, such increases in a utility's rate of return on equity will result in consumers
paying higher rates. The concept of indirect recovery represents a
may mitigate the effect
mechanism by which the ratemaking process
1 5
7
recovery.
direct
restrict
of statutes which
CONCLUSION

The allocation of plant cancellation costs, like most areas of
utility regulation, requires the equitable balancing of investor and
ratepayer interests. As the difficult process of cancellation and consolidation continues in the nation's nuclear power industry, state regulators will continue to allocate these costs. In the majority of states,
utilities will be permitted ratepayer recovery of at least some of the
costs of plants which will never provide power. This is so because
even prudent management cannot accurately foresee future events.
The experiences of the last decade, however, suggest that utilities
planning future generating capacity will exercise care to insure that
planned plants will be completed and brought on line. If demand for
new power is sufficient and the nuclear option is the sound economic
choice given competing technologies, nuclear generating stations will
be built (assuming the safety-related problems are solved). If, however, nuclear power cannot compete with other potential sources of
power, the future of this technology is dim, regardless of the regulatory treatment given utilities for plants that have been cancelled in
the past. While past cancellation decisions may affect investor perceptions of individual utilities in the short-term, the viability of future construction - whether nuclear, coal or some other technology
- will be determined by a careful assessment of the economic and
financial merits of proposed additions to generating capacity.

175. Indirect recovery was again permitted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Office of
Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 6 Ohio St. 3d 405, 453 N.E.2d 584 (1983) (per
curiam).
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